Western liberal imperialism has often been analyzed in relation to its point of origin, namely Western Europe. There are fewer studies on its impact on the rest of the world, especially studies narrated from the vantage point of the 'receiving' empires such as the Ottoman, Persian and the Chinese. This oversight may partly be due to the fact that almost all of them met their demise at either the end of World War I or closely thereafter. Yet such analyses are necessary precisely because of the common unfortunate fate of these empires, a fate that ultimately articulates the destructive impact of Western European liberal imperialism. In this article, we study the impact of Western liberal imperialism on the Ottoman Empire. After briefly discussing the definition and dimensions of Western European liberal imperialism, we focus on its impact especially in relation to the economic, political and cultural spheres.
Defining Liberal Imperialism
Historically, liberal imperialism refers to that particular stage of Western European domestic and interstate relations that succeeded the mercantile imperialism of the 1830s.
1 While scholars agreed on what comprised 'liberal' and 'imperialism' as two distinct concepts, they were, and still are, in much less agreement over the combination, namely 'liberal imperialism. ' Peter Jacobson argues that at the end of the nineteenth century, British statesman Rosebery defined liberalism domestically as 'a large policy of justice for all classes,' and imperialism internationally as 'the maintenance and consolidation of the empire.' Hence a liberal imperialist would be 'a liberal in domestic politics, and an imperialist in foreign and colonial questions.' 2 Yet such a conceptualization contained an inherent contradiction in that domestic and international matters were often intertwined. It was also difficult to continue arguing domestically for one set of principles and internationally for another. This discrepancy initially led to the legitimation of Western European intervention as a 'civilizing mission.' The universally defined Enlightenment mission of spreading reason and material and moral progress throughout the world was reinterpreted as delivering the Western conception to the rest of the world for the latter's benefit. Yet as the locals received Western intervention not under conditions of their own choosing, and as Western European progress failed to produce the same success under local conditions, the civilizing aspect of the mission came under question. As a consequence, Western European liberals gradually emerged as imperialism's sharpest critics as well as its most prominent defenders. 3 The content of the mission gradually transformed over the course of the nineteenth century from a universalist to a culturalist stance: 'Whereas earlier reform-oriented imperialist ideologies conceived of native societies as in need of radical reconstruction along Western lines, late imperial thinking questioned both the practicality and theoretical underpinnings… [and] instead of the universalist project of civilization, a new emphasis on the cultural differences between peoples came to the fore. 4 Yet this was yet another way through which Western European dominance was sustained throughout the world. As Edward Said aptly notes, 'in 1800 Western powers claimed 55% but actually held about 35% of the earth; by 1878 that proportion was 65% and by 1914, 85% as
[these countries were held in the form of] colonies, protectorates, dependencies, dominions and commonwealths.' 5 It is in this context that Said's concept of Orientalism makes sense. Unable to justify their global imperialist hegemony in terms of the civilizing mission, Western European states instead turned not only to the observation, but also the justification and reification of cultural difference --at the expense of similarity --between the West and the rest. Yet, subtly but powerfully, the message sent insinuated that Western cultures were superior to the cultures of the rest. As a consequence, Western knowledge itself turned into a force that emanated and became reproduced in non-Western contexts in a manner that delegitimated local knowledge and practices. Building on Foucault, Said suggested that Orientalist discourse was not, as it was often claimed by Europeans, just a 'fantasy' or idea about the Orient 'with no corresponding reality.' 6 It constituted reality by regulating, ordering, and defining its existence. It gained practical effects not only by informing individual's actions, but also by operating through a wide-range of social institutions:
"Orientalism can be defined as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient…by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient."
Said also drew on Foucault's notion that discourse not only created its object, but also its subject. Hence Orientalism was just as much about constructing Western culture and identity as it was about 'dominating' and 'restructuring' the Orient; it constructed both its object (Orient) and its subject (West). Said therefore argued that the Orient and the West had to be both studied simultaneously; Orientalism impacted Western states and societies just as much as it did the rest.
In relation to the power differential between the Orient and the West, Said turned to Gramsci's concept of hegemony. The West's Orientalist discourse determined history not because it was a more accurate representation of reality than the Orient's, but because it was undergirded by Western political and economic hegemony. Thus non-Western discourses about the West, or even the Orient, did not and still do not triumph, indeed do not even seem to exist, because they lacked and still lack the hegemonic political and economic power that undergirds the ability to represent. Such Western hegemony also accounted for the persistence of the Orientalist discourse for well over a century.
This imperialist reach through culture also did not necessitate direct Western European rule. Western dominance could be reproduced by colonizing the knowledge systems of local countries where the latter readily accepted the superiority of the former and spent their entire lives struggling to be like the West. Said's observation also points out to the possible ways out of this domination: not only do local countries have to be studied in their own terms by critically analyzing both their similarities and differences from the West, but the tensions and discrepancies within the Western European conceptualization also need to be brought to the fore.
And such comparative studies of the West with the rest have brought forward the critical stand on liberal imperialism that the authors of this article also adapt. Cases in point are works by Roger Fletcher, Matthew Fitzpatrick and Peter van der Veer on Germany and Britain. 7 Fletcher argues that in the case of the 1890s Wilhelmine Germany, it is impossible to identify a coherent imperial vision both in theory and in practice. Fitzpatrick approaches Western German imperialism in a larger historical context to demonstrate how the imperialist project actually helped define German nationhood at the center, thereby viewing imperialism as a nation-building strategy. Van der Veer takes this approach to Britain as he demonstrates how the national culture in both Britain and India developed in relation to their shared experience.
The emergence of that Western hegemony can be traced through the late 19th century Western European liberal imperialism based on protectionism at home and monopoly trading practices abroad. Such imperialism hindered capital accumulation in the periphery because it did not allow the rest of the world to catch up and ultimately challenge the West. With protectionism at home and territorial expansion abroad, the West was able to extend its liberal 7 Roger Fletcher 'Revisionism and Wilhelmine Imperialism. imperialism to the rest of the world for its advantage and the rest of the world's loss. 8 Empirically, if one assumes the level of British industrialization to be approximately 100 in 1913, Western European countries as a whole increased their industrialization from 73 in 1830 to 143 in 1860, to 481 by 1900 and 863 by 1913. This was partially because these countries were not interested in promoting industrialization; their priority instead was to extract surplus produce and labor, import manufactured products from each other and invest only in their colonies settled by European populations. 9 As a consequence, 'while Europe and the US protected themselves through imposing high tariffs on British imports India was not allowed to pursue such a policy…African countries and the Middle East suffered a similar fate as they de-industrialized.' 10 Underdevelopment occurred in the non-Western world precisely because non-Western exports were not on the whole necessary for the developed Western European world. Yet the non-Western world gradually became entirely dependent on these Western European exports.
This increasingly skewed economic development also impacted the relative political power and might of the countries of the world. The concomitant industrialization of warfare especially through the mass production of weapons such as the breech-loading rifle and the machine gun, the emergence of armored ships and eventually tanks gave Western Europe a distinct advantage.
Such industrialization of the tools of collective violence was also accompanied by increases in the mobility of humans, goods and information due to the construction of railways, steamships, and telegraphs. As a consequence of these technological developments, inventions, the military power of all states became directly dependent on their level of industrialization. The ensuing race not only pitted the leading empires against each other, but forced those that had not adequately industrialized to purchase vast amounts of Western-produced armaments, a process that almost bankrupted them. Such dire economic consequences also combined with the Great Depression between 1873 and 1896 that further impoverished non-Western countries while enriching the Western European ones.
The rising prominence of the principles of liberal imperialism from the 1840s to the 1870s has to be approached through this vantage point. We argue that liberal imperialism was predicated on three dimensions, economically on the illusion of free trade, politically on the 8 R. Mahmud II initially abolished these carefully kept cultural markers in the name of equality.
From then on, the Ottoman state regulated solely the outfits of all its officials who were required to wear the fez, frock coat and pants. As hopefully others in the civilian sphere also mimicked this new outfit, the Ottoman imperial system based on difference in attire would be replaced by uniform attire, thereby physically creating one, undifferentiated Ottoman subjecthood. Hence the 1829 attire law attempted to physically actualize what the1839, 1856 and 1876 imperial reforms tried to accomplish through legal means. Yet problems emerged once again. The
Ottoman public sphere no longer differentiated especially the non-Muslim subjects from the Muslim ones. The abolition of these social markers further amplified the divide between the urban rich affiliated with Western Europe one the one side and the rural poor solely embedded in local, provincial networks on the other. Over time, this divide evolved into one with the urban, Western-attired, 'modern and civilized' Muslim officials and non-Muslims on the one side, and the traditionally-attired 'conservative, backward' Muslim Ottoman subjects on the other. This cultural polarization in turn led first to skirmishes and then violence between these two 'modern'
and 'traditional' social groups. The non-Muslim subjects once again bore the brunt of this violence and their ranks eroded as a consequence.
In summary then, the Ottoman negotiation of Western liberal imperialism thus created economic, political and cultural polarization, a polarization that eventually led to the demise of the empire. The next section of the article discusses this gradual polarization in more detail.
Economic Polarization as a Consequence of the Ottoman Negotiation of Western European

Liberal Imperialism
Economic practices in Western Europe always interacted positively with the state, as the interests of the emergent bourgeoisie and the state went hand in hand as the former assumed power over the latter. Yet this was not the case in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman state practice over the economy was to merely control the latter in accordance with its own interests.
The Ottoman economy was thus perceived as a resource base for especially the administrative and military expenses of the state. Agricultural revenues made up the main chunk of state income and trade and commerce was controlled by the non-Muslim subjects who were prevented from full and continued participation in the state bureaucracy. This strict Ottoman division of labor between the non-Muslim economic actors and Muslim political ones ultimately hindered the formation of an independent Ottoman bourgeoisie that could challenge and assume power over the state. The non-Muslim subjects who could have potentially transformed into an independent economic bourgeoisie lacked the political power to take over the state because as protected religious communities they could not bear arms and assume administrative positions within the state: the latter were almost exclusively reserved from Muslims. As a consequence, the only social group capable of challenging the sultan's control over the state came from within:
reformist Muslim state officials gradually challenged the sultan and politically assumed power, thereby forming a rather unique state-dependent 'political' bourgeoisie. Their political power was predicated on their bureaucratic position and their priority was therefore not to abolish the existing Ottoman political order but to reform it. As state bureaucrats, they lacked the independent economic resources as well as economic skills that were necessary for the formation of an independent bourgeoisie. They thus replicated the sultan's stand in relation to the Ottoman economy: they were not intent on building alliances with the non-Muslim economic bourgeoisie, but instead on controlling and repressing them in accordance with the needs of the state bureaucracy. Just as it had been during the earlier centuries under the sultans' rule also during the period of reformist state officials, any attempt undertaken by either non-Muslim tradesmen or merchants in the cities, or by predominantly Muslim notables in the countryside to accumulate economic resources independent of the state were immediately cut down through confiscations.
As a consequence, it was extremely challenging if not impossible for these economic actors to follow the example of their Western European counterparts in transforming their economic resources to political ones. Yet a significant consequence of the 1839 political reforms was the abolition of such state confiscations. Even then, however, the significant economic wealth that was accumulated by the urban-based non-Muslim merchants and their rural Muslim counterparts could not be invested in ways that translated into political power. The urban-based non-Muslim subjects lacked such power due to the structural divide within the Ottoman social system; the rural-based Muslim notables tried but could not have permanent access to the political power of their urban counterparts located within the state bureaucracy due to center-periphery tensions.
As a consequence, the ensuing economic polarization after the reforms led not to the transformation of the social order, but instead to its demise.
Origins: Sixteenth-century European Price Revolution As soon as the Ottoman state was initially founded in late thirteenth century as a principality in western Asia Minor, its fortuitous location on the historic trade route between the east and west benefited it economically. Asia
Minor contained many inns, caravanserais and extensive postal and security systems along established trade roads and routes. As the Ottoman state expanded over the ensuing centuries, it employed significant sea ports like the ones on the Red Sea, Gulf of Basra and Lebanon as well as land routes through Asia Minor to sustain its economic resources.
Economically, Ottoman urban production was organized through the guild system that was very strictly controlled by the state. This state-control was due to the necessity to procure the necessary staples for the population of the imperial capital, for the sultan's palace as well for the large army and the navy. The most significant element of such urban control was the regulation of prices whereby production was determined by the demands of the state, undermining the guilds' capacity to specialize in manufacturing new products. The initial land system termed tımar demanded the procurement of a certain number of mounted cavalries to the state in return for land use. The Ottoman land system thus protected the interests of the tax-farmers instead of the peasants working the land. As a consequence, peasants losing land had to stay and work locally; had they migrated to urban centers like their Western
European counterparts did, they also could not find jobs in specialized manufacturing because guild masters were prohibited from engaging in such activities. Hence no migrant surplus labor flooded the Ottoman cities and towns to then find employment in specialized manufactures.
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The sixteenth century was a significant turning point for the Ottoman economy due to the developments taking place in Western Europe. Europeans engaged in overseas explorations out of economic necessity. By reaching India through the south of the African continent, they undermined the Ottoman trade monopoly over the land trade routes between the east and the west. By mistakenly 'discovering' the American continent during this process, they also accessed vast amounts of gold and silver that were then infused into the European continent. export of raw materials. Another factor that caused havoc with the Ottoman financial system was the warfare technology that started to transform during the seventeenth century. The necessity to have a disciplined army trained throughout the year made the Ottoman practice of recruiting mounted cavalries through the tımar system redundant. When the standing Ottoman army could no longer be recruited from the provinces in this manner, the salaries necessitated by the army started to expand by leaps and bounds generating significant budget deficits.
The economic reaction of the Ottoman state to these developments was to issue more coins from the same amount of silver at a time when the empire was flooded by Western European silver coins of American origin. As a consequence, the prices of goods escalated just as Ottoman military expenses compounded. The only economic solution the Ottoman state could find was to transform its land system into the iltizam practice whereby the usufructary rights to land were now farmed out to the highest bidder for periods ranging from one to three years. This transformation in land use provided a great opportunity for those domestic entrepreneurs who had accrued wealth through trade, usury or holding state office. Such entrepreneurs who could not invest their wealth in economic production could now invest in land for quick profits. Yet even though the iltizam practice did indeed generate cash for the state, it did so at a tremendous cost to peasants. Peasants could no longer till the land themselves and instead had to work under the exploitation of land holders (mültezim) who tried to maximize their profits in the shortest possible time. As peasants were pressured to leave their lands and mounted cavalries abandoned, some of the now landless peasants joined the now dismissed cavalries to engage in local brigandage such as the Celali revolts. The rest migrated to urban centers like their European counterparts had done earlier. Yet unlike the latter, however, they could not find employment and therefore enrolled in religious schools (medrese), thereby increasing the restless, dissatisfied urban masses. These religious students soon started to raid the mansions of the rich state officials, wealthy merchants and tax collectors, carrying the rural unrest to the urban areas.
Others joined the same large households of rich state officials as private mercenaries.
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were marked by such political turmoil as the central power of the sultan started to devolve. Especially significant in this process was the ability of the newly rich, almost exclusively Muslim land holders to pass their tax-farming privileges from one generation to the other. Strong provincial families that started to emerge as a consequence turned over a portion of the collected taxes to the state while retaining an even larger portion for their own use. 16 The transformation of the iltizam to the malikane land tenure system had a significant detrimental impact on the peasants as short-term use was replaced by long life-long tenure. They also increased their wealth by engaging in local and inter-state trade.
For instance, the Balkan families located near ports expanded wool and grain cultivation to then containing its military expansion, it did so at the eventual expense of the Ottoman Empire. 19 The remorse felt by the British cabinet for leaving the Ottoman state alone and thereby forcing them into an agreement with Russia is best expressed by Lord Palmerstone who stated that 'No British cabinet at any period…ever made so great a mistake in regard to foreign affairs.'The British Foreign Minister also emphasized the significance of the integration of the Ottoman economy for Britain as follows: 'If, from a political point of view, the independence of Turkey is of great importance, in a commercial sense, it is of no less importance. It is quite true that with no other country is our trade so liberally permitted and carried on as with Turkey.' G.D. Empire. The association not only distributed free cotton seeds, subsidized the purchase of local machinery and established local courses to raise the local production quality, but also supported the İzmir-Aydın railroad. The Aegean regions experiencing an increase in cotton production were also those located along this railroad. Another example demonstrating how closely the Ottoman economy became linked to the British one relates to emery stone production. These were produced in the Aegean region by the British, transported by British-built railroads, and finally exported in full to Britain. Manganese, antimuan ore, chrome and borax comprise the other minerals produced in the region solely in accordance with the demands of the British industry with no impact whatsoever on the local regional economy. As a consequence of this British-dependent economic development, the economic activities of the Aegean region mimicked the British economic cycles of crisis and prosperity with a two-year lag.
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Another significant consequence of this process of Ottoman economic penetration spearheaded by British railroad construction was the emergence of a non-Muslim bourgeoisie dependent on Western Europe. Even though railroads had been built, it was not easy for European merchants to internally market to the Ottoman consumer the goods they brought to the Smyrna port to then gather and deliver the raw materials produced by the peasants to the port.
They needed intermediaries who could facilitate this process. Ottoman non-Muslims not only knew the languages spoken within and outside the empire, but they were also culturally attuned to the taste of Ottoman consumers. Even though they were ideal candidates, As Ottoman subjects, the local non-Muslims were subject to the legal system of the empire and did not benefit from the European trade privileges. Another practice that emerged around this time was Increased reliance on merchants designed to bypass the provincial notables and to also generate increasing revenue for the state also failed because non-Muslim merchants had already developed strong alliances with Western European states. As a consequence, the few Muslim merchants who had managed to stay active were the ones who were eliminated in the process. In addition, even though escalated trade with Europe in general and the British in particular subjected the peasantry to increasing commercialization, it nevertheless did generate money-rent for the Ottoman state. The adverse economic consequences of this temporary material gain were, however, much more far-reaching. Eventually, the Muslim merchant class was eliminated, the Ottoman crafts industry destroyed, and the Ottoman economy peripheralized.
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Another adverse consequence of the imbalance between increasing export production accompanied by growing demands for import was the generation of a severe balance-ofpayments problem. Ottoman state officials attempted to cope with these problems by borrowing from the European states. The outcome was disastrous: caught in an increasing spiral of debts, Rather then pledging allegiance to the sultan, they instead professed loyalty to the state. What therefore followed in the aftermath of the second constitutional revolution in 1908 when they assumed power was proto-Turkish nationalism. Even though it was not explicitly stated as such, non-Muslim subjects were politically marginalized and excluded from the new body politic of the future nation, leading to violence against non-Muslim citizens. Hence liberal imperialism had once again penetrated and destabilized the existing social and political structure. failed in bringing about the envisioned political equality on two grounds: they were unable to get rid of the inherent structural inequality between the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects and they could not wrest ultimate power away from the sultan himself.
The inability of the reformist bureaucrats to wrest power away from the sultan led to their eventual demise in 1878 as sultan Abdülhamid II employed the occasion of the disastrous Ottoman defeat by the Russians to once again centralize power and authority in his person for the next three decades. These three decades were extremely significant in the life-course of the empire. Even though the sultan did indeed attempt to preserve the empire, the resources available to him were increasingly scant. Especially the industrialized nature of warfare necessitated the purchase of armaments from the West, ones that not only had to be imported to the empire but in the process also drained the Ottoman treasury. As a consequence, the sultan employed the diplomacy of pitting Western European states against each other to sustain the empire. Given the political pressures to establish equality, he also focused on creating a common political identity that could unite all his subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim alike.
Constructing an Ottoman Imperial Identity
The vision of the Ottoman sultan was not predicated on developing a contractual relationship with his subjects but instead autocratic in nature. Even though reformist state officials advocated constitutional rule, the majority of Muslim imperial subjects were indifferent to it because the existing system sustained their naturalized dominance. And it was this dynamic that helped the sultan sustain his autocratic rule for three more decades. In doing so, however, he had to construct an imperial identity that would unify his subjects against the threat posed by the vision of equal rights, a vision that could lead instead to separatist movements. Another significant educational endeavor sultan Abdülhamid II undertook to perhaps prevent the separatist tendencies particularly among the Arabs was the establishment of a 'School for Tribes (Aşiret Mektebi)' with the intent to recruit, train and thereby socialize into the Ottoman social structure the sons of significant Arab tribal leaders. These future leaders would learn Turkish and develop loyalty to the Ottoman sultan and caliph. 50 It was especially the Arab appreciation in the recruitment of 48 Arab students to the Ottoman War Academy that led the 48 During this time, secondary schools (10-15 year old) also increased. By the Crimean war, there were some 60 in the entire empire attended by some 3,350 students while some 16,750 were enrolled in medreses or advanced theological schools. 49 At these schools all students had to wear uniforms and at advanced schools army officers made up the teaching faculty. Mathematics, gunnery and other technical subjects and later military history, languages and literature were taught from a military point of view. Army also set up its own translation offices and printing presses for the books it used. sultan to found such a school. 51 The sultan considered that such integration into the Ottoman system would also prevent the insistence of the Arab intellectuals for education in their own language and thereby prevent the emergence of separatist movements. Other Ottoman state measures taken to integrate the Arab provinces into the empire against the centripetal forces of liberal imperialism included increased financial investment in the infrastructure, appointment of able administrators, inclusion of the Arabs within the Ottoman ruling elite, and the recruitment of Arab officers for the Ottoman army. 52 Another policy the sultan advocated was sending expensive gifts, awards and medals to local tribal leaders. 53 Merchant capital in domestic circulation provided several services as it became a surrogate banking institution for the state as well as a cash reserve for tax-farmers, corrupt pashas, and monopoly (mukataa) holders.
Development of Separatist Movements
empire, and promoted Western-style education that escalated knowledge capital once again shut off from the imperial body politic, it served to fuel separatist aspirations. Ottoman rule. The Yemen tribes rebelling against the sultan were also financed by the British.
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The British state also attempted to undermine the caliphate of the Ottoman sultan in the 1880s, as
British propaganda for the appointment of an ethnically Arab caliph commenced in the Arablanguage newspapers published in London. Another British attempt was to return the caliphate to Egypt. It was assumed that if and when the caliphate was returned to Egypt that was already a British colony, then the British state could wield power over all world Muslims. 57 Such British agitation for an Arab caliph then spread to Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo, Baghdad among other cities and eventually became effective in leading the Arab populace to take a stand against the 54 Another factor that needs to be noted, however, is that given the double-standard Western European liberal imperialism employed in protecting their own states and societies while advocating the abolition of all obstacles in the states and societies which they wanted to turn into captive markets and continuous sources of raw material. As a consequence, it is unclear if the Ottoman minorities would have been able to help save the Ottoman Empire even if they had been allowed to invest in it. 55 
Cultural Polarization as a Consequence of the Ottoman Negotiation of Western European Liberal Imperialism
Perhaps the most understudied component of Western European liberal imperialism comprises its cultural dimension because the economic and political components are much more readily visible and studied in detail. Yet, following Edward Said, one also needs to bring into the analysis the much less articulated transformation that especially altered the organization of public space in non-Western contexts. Initially, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, industrial and technological developments in Western Europe assumed a publicly visible form in especially the major cities. As landless peasants migrated from the countryside to cities to engage in manufacturing, and as the bourgeoisie assumed increasing economic and political power, the urban landscape transformed to display the changes in the ensuing urban lifestyle, one now desired by all citizens. While factories and industrial plants often dominated the urban periphery, railroads and steamships connected them not only to the major urban centers but also to marketing destinations throughout the world. As railways and later subways escalated the pace of transportation, the quick circulating urban populace traveled through and frequently visited along the well-lit, clean, wide boulevards the museums, parks, public squares, dined in touching their foreheads to the ground during daily prayers. He instead decided on the brimless cap called the fez, a raised, circular cap first introduced to the empire by the naval commander and his men serving in North Africa. The sultan initially allowed that a turban could be wrapped around this cap to appease those resisting the new headgear, but he was firm about dictating the attire of all of his officials who for the first time would dress exactly the same, thereby no longer signaling the differences in rank among them. All the sultan's officials had to don the same uniform consisting of the fez, white shirts, black vests or jackets and black trousers. 59 Likewise, all his soldiers had to wear uniform Western-style tighter pants, tunics and boots. The clothing was no longer layered as it had once been and no one could theoretically differentiate the rank of one official from the other from clothing alone. By promulgating a civil code for attire for all his officials, the sultan once again symbolically unified them under his rule. And by also not putting in place such a code for the populace, he also effectively eliminated the traditional markers that differentiated the various social groups.
Perhaps the most significant elimination was the public distinction in clothing between the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. In a manner that reflected the legal equality promised to his non-Muslim subjects by his reforms, the sultan thus ensured that no differences in attire between them and their traditionally more privileged Muslim counterparts. All officials had to wear the regulated uniforms, while all the subjects could wear whatever they chose, hopefully attires similar to those of the sultan's officials. As such, the sultan culturally renegotiated Production of New Urban Public Spaces Along these significant cultural changes in the Ottoman state's use of public space, the civilian use of space also transformed in especially urban centers. Initially, Ottoman state officials met and entertained in their mansions; now, they participated in urban life as they visited and entertained each other at restaurants, cafes and similar places that were also technically --though not economically --accessible to the rest of the populace. Traditionally, public spaces especially the Muslim populace employed comprised of coffee houses, barbershops and other small shops and arcades often built in the vicinity of mosques to support mosque expenses, bakeries, bath houses, and places of worship. 64 The few inns, drinking halls and urban shops were often operated by non-Muslims; most of the food was It is apt to conclude the essay with a final narrative that captures how the Muslim Turks were eventually going to act upon the public chasm that they so frequently observed. Ottoman official İsmail Habib Sevük captures the increasingly polarizing emotions such a dramatic difference generated as he visits with Mustafa Kemal during the first decades of the twentieth century the city of Mersin, recently taken back by the Turkish national forces from Allied occupation. The escalating Turkish nationalism to overcome the divide is evident in his observations and tone as he states:
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[t]he street we walk on is paved, the houses on either side are all built of stone, clean and white. It is evident that there is wealth here, construction, and order among the populace displaying incredible enthusiasm…Still…we know that these houses are not ours. Even though the money that went into building these…houses came out of our pockets, we do not own the deed!...Why do I not feel like I am going on my own street? Look at those Christian women crying in their rich costumes…the sobs of some reach all the way to us. I think to myself, why do they cry, are their tears [like mine] because of joy?'
